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Extraterritorial Application of U.S.
Antitrust Laws to Other Pacific
Countries: Proposed Bilateral
Agreements for Resolving
International Conflicts within the Pacific
Community
By SEUNG WHA CHANG*
I. INTRODUCTION
The basic antitrust statutes of the United States, such as the Sher-
man Act,1 the Clayton Act,2 and the Federal Trade Commission Act,
3
provide some form of jurisdiction over international commerce. In the
landmark decision of United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa),
Judge Learned Hand of the Second Circuit held that U.S. courts have
subject matter jurisdiction over antitrust activity committed abroad if it
affected, and was intended to affect, U.S. commerce.4 This decision has
* Member of the Korean Bar, Judge of the Seoul District Civil & Criminal Court, Ko-
rea, 1988-1991; Lecturer of Dongguk University, Graduate School of Administration, Korea,
1991; Currently SJ.D. Candidate of Harvard Law School. This Article is dedicated to profes-
sor Oliver Oldman in honor of his official retirement from the Harvard Law School in 1993.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988). Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that "[e]very con-
tract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or
commerce ... with foreign nations" is illegal. Section 2 also prohibits monopolization and
attempts to monopolize "any part of trade or commerce... with foreign nations."
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1988). But the issue of whether an antitrust plaintiff, who serves
process pursuant to worldwide service of process provisions of § 12 of the Clayton Act, may
properly establish venue under the Alien Venue Act is not yet settled in the U.S. For a discus-
sion of this issue, see generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Personal Jurisdiction and Venue in Private
Antitrust Actions, 67 IOWA L. REV. 485, 508-09 (1982); Julian 0. von Kalinowski, 10 ANTI-
TRUST LAWS AND TRADE REG., § 104.03[2] (1993). For recent cases dealing with this issue,
see Michelson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 709 F.Supp. 1279 (S.D.N.Y.
1989); Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Electric Co., Ltd., 885 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1989).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-68 (1988).
4. 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945). The Second Circuit heard the case on certifica-
tion from the Supreme Court because four Justices of the Supreme Court disqualified them-
selves and thus deprived the Court of the minimum statutory quorum of six Justices. For a
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become the cornerstone of extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust
laws.
U.S. Federal Courts hearing antitrust often use the relatively liberal
standard of the Alcoa "effects doctrine" to find jurisdiction over conduct
occurring outside the U.S. by foreign corporations. From the perspective
of foreign nations, the long-arm jurisdiction of U.S. courts has resulted in
the erosion of the "territoriality principle," which derives from a state's
sovereignty over national territory. Further, only U.S. antitrust law per-
mits the recovery of treble damages in private antitrust suits.' This is
viewed by foreign nations as too harsh a remedy to impose on foreign
defendants.6
As a result, extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws has led
to several "international conflicts."7 One of the most serious was marked
by retaliatory legislation initiated by several foreign countries.8 There
are two kinds of "blocking statutes." First, "discovery blocking statutes"
restrict the extent to which U.S. litigants can obtain evidence or compel
production of commercial documents abroad for use in U.S. proceed-
ings.9 Second, "judgment blocking statutes" restrict, directly or indi-
rectly, the enforcement of U.S. judgments.1"
This Article analyzes problems involved in international conflicts
caused by extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws and the re-
sulting foreign retaliatory response. This Article proposes adopting bi-
lateral treaties to resolve such extraterritoriality conflicts. The scope of
this analysis will be limited to the conflicts between the U.S. and other
countries belonging to Pacific Community (Pacific Countries)1' which
brief description of the background of the Alcoa litigation, see PHILIP AREEDA & Louis
KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 475-76 (4th ed. 1988).
5. Hearings on S. 397 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 8
(1985) [hereinafter Hearings].
6. Most countries have traditionally not enforced their domestic antitrust laws, if they
have them, as rigorously as the U.S. has. For this reason, foreign countries would be more
sensitive to the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws.
7. For illustration of specific conflicts stemming from extraterritorial enforcement of
U.S. antitrust laws, see Hearings, supra note 5, at 62-68.
8. European Countries legislating the blocking statutes includ! Great Britain, France,
West Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. For a brief description of these statutes, see
P.C.F. Pettit & C.J.D. Styles, The International Response to the Extraterritorial Application of
United States Antitrust Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 697 (1982); Carl A. Cira, Jr., The Challenge of
Foreign Laws to Block American Antitrust Actions, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 247 (1982). For a
discussion of blocking statutes of countries belonging to Pacific Community, see infra Part II.
9. See infra notes 13, 22, 28, 38-39 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 23, 29-30, 40 and accompanying text.
11. The term "Pacific Community" is not new. This term has been used by many scholars
for the last two decades. For the definition of this term, see International Legal Note, The
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have blocking statutes. 12 This Article does not review the extraterritorial
application of the Pacific Countries' antitrust laws.
Part II of this Article examines several blocking statutes of the Pa-
cific Countries and the likelihood that the countries will actually invoke
these statutes.
Part III looks at the unilateral efforts of the U.S. to mitigate foreign
resistance to the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws. Such
efforts include, not only the "jurisdictional rule of reason" developed by
some Federal Courts, but also legislative and governmental initiatives
that propose to revise U.S. antitrust laws in order to accommodate for-
eign concerns. Part III concludes that a unilateral approach is funda-
mentally limited as a solution to conflicts caused by extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust laws.
Part IV begins with an examination of the core issues involved with
proposals for resolving such conflicts, and concludes that bilateral trea-
ties, based upon mutual concession, be adopted as a solution. The bal-
ance of Part IV examines possible treaty provisions which would benefit
both the U.S. and other Pacific Countries. In conclusion, this Article
recommends that instead of substantive rules, jurisdictional and remedial
rules (e.g. jurisdictional rule of reason, detrebling provisions, and provi-
sions invalidating blocking statutes) should be included within the pro-
posed treaties.
Concept of a "Pacific Community,'" 54 AusTL L.J. 689 (1980); Alex Chin Guan Lee & Anjana
Bahl, Pacific Basin, 24 INT'L LAW. 559 (1990); Peter Bentley & Yuk Tong Cheung, Pacific
Basin, 22 INT'L LAW. 1235 (1988). There could be a variety of standards by which one defines
the scope of the Pacific Community. In any event, this Article includes at least North America,
Oceania, and East and South Asian countries in the ambit of the pacific community. Also, the
term "Pacific Countries" hereinafter will be used to denote the countries belonging to the
Pacific Community.
12. International conflicts caused by extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws be-
gan first between the U.S. and European countries. See supra note 8. Hence, most institutional
and scholarly works on the issues relating to extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws
have focused on the conflicts between the U.S. and European countries. See e.g., Edward F.
Glynn, Jr., International Agreements to Allocate Jurisdiction O)Tr Mergers, 1990 FORDHAM
CORP. L. INsT. 35 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1991); Antitrust and Trade Policy in the United States
and the European Community, 1985 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1986);
Bates C. Toms, The French Response to the Extraterritorial Application of United States Anti-
trust Laws, 15 INT'L LAW. 585 (1981); Pettit & Styles, supra note 8; Cira, supra note 8. In
contrast, the extraterritoriality conflicts between the U.S. and other Pacific Countries emerged
recently with the increase in international trade and commerce between these countries. This
development has drawn relatively little scholarly attention in comparison with the conflicts
between the U.S. and European countries. As with the existing and potential trade frictions
between the U.S. and Pacific Countries, especially East Asian countries, extraterritorial appli-
cation of U.S. antitrust laws has become a sensitive contemporary issue within the Pacific
Community.
1993]
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II. THE RETALIATORY RESPONSES: "BLOCKING
STATUTES" OF SEVERAL PACIFIC COUNTRIES
The following sections examine several statutes of the various Pa-
cific Countries that are directly or indirectly intended to block extraterri-
torial application of U.S. antitrust laws. Some of these blocking statutes
preclude the discovery of documents located in their territory and bar the
enforcement of foreign judgments. Others concentrate only on a single
goal.
A. Canada
In 1976, the Combines Investigation Act of 1923 was amended to
empower the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission to permit persons
in Canada to disregard certain foreign laws, judgments, or decrees. 13
Later that year the Canadian Parliament blocked attempts by Westing-
house Electric Corporation (Westinghouse) to obtain documents from
Canada relating to operations of an alleged uranium cartel.14 This oc-
curred while a private antitrust action, brought by Westinghouse, was
pending against several domestic and foreign competitors, including Ca-
nadian companies." In addition to Canada, other countries have in-
voked blocking legislation to resist requests by Westinghouse for
documents of foreign defendants. 6 Invocation of blocking statutes by
foreign countries demonstrates foreign hostility toward the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction by U.S. district courts.
In 1984, Canada also adopted the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures
Act.1 7 This statute was designed to block enforcement of U.S. antitrust
laws. 8 The Act contains a "clawback" provision,19 similar to that con-
13. Combines Investigation Act, ch. 76, § 31.5, 1974-75-76 S.C. 1552. This authority
could be invoked only after inquiry and for reasons of "national interest."
14. S. Prov. C. 1976-2368; Stat. 0 & R 76-644.
15. See In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1253-54 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding
that the district court had jurisdiction under the "effects doctrine" articulated in the Alcoa
decision, and rejecting the foreign defendants' argument that the court should adopt a broader
balancing of interests approach in finding jurisdiction over foreign dcfendants).
16. See Note, Reassessment of International Application of Antitrust Laws: Blocking Stat-
utes, Balancing Tests, and Treble Damages, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PitOBS. 197, 204 (Summer
1987).
17. Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, ch. 49, 1984 S.C. 1863.
18. Joseph P. Griffin, The Impact on Canada of the Extraterritorial Application of the U.S.
Antitrust Laws, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 435, 439 (asserting that, even though the blocking statute
never explicitly mentions U.S. antitrust laws, "it's not too hard to understand who [it is] talk.
ing about.").
19. Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act § 9, 1984 S.C. at 1869.
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tamined in the British Protection of Trading Interests Act.20 This provi-
sion permits the Canadian government to order Canadian companies not
to comply with foreign regulations.2" It also provides that the Attorney
General of Canada may issue orders restricting the production or disclo-
sure of any records in the possession or control of a Canadian resident to
a foreign court asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction.2 Further, it can
prevent the enforcement of foreign antitrust judgments in Canadian
courts.2 3
In order to address the existing and potential tension resulting from
the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws and the blocking
statutes of Canada, both countries entered into an antitrust cooperation
agreement in 1984.24 This agreement includes several provisions regard-
ing notification, consultation, cooperation and the application of each
country's antitrust laws.25 Despite the existence of this agreement, it is
still likely that Canada will invoke blocking legislation in "appropriate"
circumstances. The agreement fails to prevent U.S. courts from ordering
the production of a foreign defendant's documents should the circum-
stances warrant. Thus, a U.S. court can order document production in
the discovery process if following notification, consultation, and request
for cooperation, conflicts of interest still exist between the two countries.
In such a situation, Canada could respond by invoking its discovery
blocking statute. Moreover, the agreement contains no provisions deal-
ing with the enforcement of foreign judgments. Thus, Canada can still
invoke the judgment blocking provisions when a final judgment is viewed
as improper. This can occur even if the Canadian government has coop-
erated with the U.S. in the proceedings of the litigation. Finally, "the
agreements cannot resolve the problems stemming from private antitrust
litigation, because the government cannot control private treble damages
20. Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, ch. 11, § 6, reprinted in Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 959, at F-1 (Apr. 10, 1980). Where British firms have made treble
damage payments under the U.S. antitrust laws, section 6 of this Act enables British defend-
ants to recover damage payments by making a claim against U.S. subsidiaries in Britain. Id.
This "claw back" statute is an example of extreme foreign resistance to U.S. antitrust laws.
Britain also legislated this Act to retaliate for U.S. antitrust enforcement against British sub-
jects. Discovery and judgment blocking provisions are also included in this Act. Id. §§ 1-2, 4-
5.
21. Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act § 5, 1984 S.C. at 1866-67.
22. Id. § 3, 1984 S.C. at 1864-65.
23. Id § 8, 1984 S.C. at 1868.
24. See Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of
America and Canada as to Notification, Consultation and Cooperation with Respect to the
Application of National Antitrust Laws, reprinted in 46 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1156, at 560 (Mar. 15, 1984).
25. Id
1993]
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actions."'2 6 Thus, until there is a solution to the problem of private treble
damages actions, Canada is likely to continue to apply its blocking legis-
lation to these types of cases.
B. Australia
The Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act of
197627 conferred on the Australian Attorney-General extensive powers
to control the production of documents or giving of oral evidence to for-
eign courts.28 The Foreign Antitrust Judgments (Restriction of Enforce-
ment) Act of 197929 also empowered the Attorney-General to restrict or
prevent enforcement of judgments rendered by foreign courts in proceed-
ings instituted under an antitrust law if certain conditions are met.3 0 In-
terestingly, these two blocking statutes were enacted while Westinghouse
was attempting to obtain documents belonging to Australian defendants
in In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation.31
In 1982 Australia, like Canada, also entered into a mutual assistance
agreement with the U.S.32 Most provisions in this agreement are similar
to those contained in the Canada-U.S. agreement. 3 Thus, despite the
existence of the agreement, Australia is likely to invoke its blocking stat-
utes in the same circumstances that Canada might invoke its own block-
26. Note, supra note 16, at 203.
27. Act No. 121, 1976 Austl. Acts P. 1125, as amended by Foreign Proceedings (Prohibi-
tion of Certain Evidence) Amendment Act, No. 202, 1976 Austl. Acts P. 1743, as implemented
by Order of the Attorney General, Gov't Gaz. No. S 214 (Nov. 29, 1976).
28. Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act No. 121, § 5(1), 1976
Austl. Acts P. 1126. These powers arise only if the Attorney-General is satisfied that a foreign
tribunal is exercising or likely to exercise jurisdiction, or powers of a kind or in a manner not
consistent with international law or comity, or if he/she is satisfied that the imposition of
restrictions is desirable to protect the national interest. Id. § 4(1). Judicial review of whether
these conditions precedent to the exercise of the Attorney-General's powers have been met is
effectively excluded by § 4(2).
29. Act No. 13, 1979 Austl. Acts P. 142.
30. Three conditions precedent limit that power. The Attorney-General must be satisfied
that either the judgment was (1) rendered in a manner inconsistent with international law or
comity, or (2) that acquiescence to or enforcement of the judgment would prejudice Australian
domestic commercial interests, or (3) that complete or partial recognition of the judgment
would jeopardize Australian international trading interests. See John Cannon, III, Foreign
Statutory Response to Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust Law, 1 DICK.
INT'L L. ANN. 125, 146-47 (1982).
31. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
32. See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Australia Relating to Cooperation of Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, re-
printed in 43 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1071, art. 5, at 36 (July 1, 1982),
33. One important difference is that the Australia-U.S. agreement requires Australia to
exercise forbearance in the use of its discovery blocking legislation. See id.
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ing statutes.34
Further, Australia passed a new blocking statute in 1984.35 Section
10 of this new statute36 goes even farther than the "clawback" provision
contained in the British Protection of Trading Interests Act.37 It thus
appears that the Australia-U.S. agreement of 1982 is ineffective in resolv-
ing the extraterritoriality conflict between Australia and the U.S.
C. Republic of the Philippines
In 1980, in reaction to a U.S. Justice Department grand jury investi-
gation into activities involving U.S. coconut oil sales by American sub-
sidiaries of Philippine parent companies, the Philippine President
decreed a blocking statute.38 The statute bars production of documents
located in the Philippines to foreign competition law authorities.
39 It
also prohibits enforcement of foreign judgments for multiple damages
without clearance from a designated representative of the Philippine
President.' Despite the new law the U.S. still filed a civil suit in the
coconut oil matter.4 1
It is likely that the Philippines will utilize this blocking statute in
situations similar to the coconut oil case, unless an effective means for
resolving extraterritorial conflicts involving U.S. antitrust law is adopted.
D. Japan and Korea
Japan, like the countries already mentioned, places obstacles in the
way of foreign application of U.S. antitrust laws. Article 200 of the Japa-
nese Civil Procedure Act42 requires preconditions to be met before a for-
eign court's judgment will be deemed valid.43 It is the duty of Japanese
34. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
35. Foreign Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act No. 3, 1984 Austl. Acts P. 18.
36. Id. § 10. This section authorizes recovery by an Australian national of the full
amount, not just the noncompensatory portion, of any foreign treble damages judgment im-
posed in a foreign country for violating that nation's antitrust laws. Recall that only the U.S.
antitrust laws allow recovery of treble damages in private actions. See supra note 5 and accom-
panying text
37. See supra note 20.
38. Presidential Decree No. 1718 (Aug. 21, 1980).
39. Id § 1.
40. Id
41. The grand jury investigation resulted in the filing of United States v. Crown Oil Corp.,
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 1981) (Civ. No. 81-0787-TJH), which was resolved by a consent decree
entered on June 18, 1982. Id, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) , 64,823 (C.D. Cal.).
42. Act No. 61 (1926).
43. The conditions illustrated in Article 200 of the Act are as follows:
(1) That jurisdiction of the foreign court is not denied by laws and orders or by
treaty;
1993]
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courts to examine whether these conditions are satisfied. Originally, this
provision was not intended to block the enforcement of U.S. court judg-
ments in antitrust cases. However, it is likely that it will be used for
blocking the enforcement of U.S. court judgments in antitrust cases in-
volving Japanese defendants. For instance, a U.S. judgment allowing re-
covery of treble damages, not just compensatory damages, against
Japanese companies might be held to be "contrary to the public order or
good morals in Japan"'  and therefore invalid. It is also possible that
Japanese courts will invoke this provision to reject enforcement of U.S.
judgments,45 if the U.S. courts use an excessively liberal standard in find-
ing venue or personal jurisdiction over Japanese companies."
Article 203 of the Korean Civil Procedure Act47 was modelled after
Article 200 of its Japanese counterpart. The key language of both provi-
sions is very similar. Thus, like Japanese courts, Korean courts are also
likely to invoke Article 203 and reject enforcement of U.S. judgments 4
(2) That the defendant defeated, being a Japanese, has received s-.rvice of summons
or any other necessary orders to commence procedure otherwise by a public notice or
has appeared without receiving service thereof;
(3) That the judgment of a foreign court is not contrary to the public order or good
morals in Japan;
(4) That there is mutual guarantee.
44. Id.
45. In order to enforce a foreign judgment in Japan, one must obtain an "enforcement
judgment" from the Japanese court. One of the requirements for obtaining such an "enforce-
ment judgment" is that a foreign judgment must satisfy the conditions illustrated in Jap. Civil
Proc. Act, art. 200. See Article 24 of the Civil Enforcement Act. Act No. 4 (1979).
46. Go-Video v. Akai Electric Co., Ltd., 885 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1989), in which one
Korean and three Japanese manufacturers were defendants, is a typical case of "long-arm
jurisdiction." The Ninth Circuit held that a United States antitrust plaintiff can sue a foreign
defendant in any U.S. federal court, based on the defendant's "nationwide contacts" with the
United States, regardless of the existence or non-existence of its contacts with the forum dis-
trict. Id. at 1414-15. In Go-Video, many of the defendant Japanese electronic companies set-
tled with Go-Video. The three defendant Japanese companies that chose not to settle with Go-
Video litigated the case in Arizona, and on May 30, 1991, the jury found for the defendants.
Go-Video has announced it would appeal this decision. See Morrison & Foerster, Case Study
No.5, Go-Video Case: Enforcement and Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws 2-3
(Unpublished Memorandum in U.S. Antitrust Law Seminar sponsored by Morrison & Focrs-
ter, June 28, 1991, Seoul, Korea) [hereinafter Morrison & Foerster]. If many of the defendant
Japanese companies had lost the case without settling and the final judgment had granted
treble damages for the plaintiff, it is likely that Go-Video would have tried to enforce the final
judgment in Japan. If so, the Japanese court would have to determine whether enforcement of
the U.S. court judgment under Article 24 of the Japanese Civil Enforcement Act was
warranted.
47. Civil Procedure Act No. 547 (1960).
48. Korean Civil Procedure Act, Articles 476 and 477, dealing with enforcement of for-
eign judgments, were also modeled after Article 24 of the Japanese Civil Enforcement Act, See
supra note 45.
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in antitrust cases under similar circumstances.49
I. U.S. EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
The U.S. courts' use of long-arm jurisdiction over acts committed
abroad in antitrust cases based upon the "effects doctrine," has faced
retaliation from several Pacific Countries in the form of blocking stat-
utes. The existing bilateral agreements between the U.S. and two Pacific
Countries (i.e. Canada and Austria) are ineffective in resolving the con-
flict. For these reasons, international conflicts stemming from the extra-
territorial application of U.S. antitrust laws have continued. Part III
reviews the domestic efforts of the U.S. to mitigate international tension.
This part also examines the practical limitations of unilateral efforts to
resolve these extraterritorial conflicts.
A. Jurisdictional Rule of Reason
Starting in 1976, with the decision in Timberlane Lumber Co. v.
Bank of America (Timberlane 1),10 a trend has emerged where the exer-
cise of national jurisdiction over extraterritorial activities, which are also
subject to foreign law, is tempered by international comity.51 The Ninth
Circuit in Timberlane I2 and the Third Circuit in Mannington Mills,
Inc v. Congoleum Corp.5" modified the "effects" test by adding consider-
ations of comity to the determination of whether the court should exer-
cise jurisdiction over antitrust cases involving foreign defendants. The
result was termed a "jurisdictional rule of reason.'"' The Third and
Ninth Circuits employed balancing tests in such jurisdictional determina-
49. In Go-Video, the defendant Korean electronic company (Samsung Electronics)
reached an out-of-court monetary settlement resulting in a substantial payment to Go-Video.
See Morrison & Foerster, supra note 46, at 2-3. If Samsung Electronics had not settled the
case and the final judgment had granted treble damages for the plaintiff, Go-Video would have
been required to enforce the final judgment in Korea, unless Samsung Electronics had substan-
tial assets within the U.S. Under such a hypothetical situation, the Korean court might reject
enforcement of the U.S. court judgment, pursuant to Articles 476 and 477 of the Korean Civil
Procedure Act.
50. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) (Timberlane 1), remanded, 574 F.Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal.
1983), afi'd, 749 F.2d 1378.(9th Cir. 1984) (Timberlane I1), cerl. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985).
51. James G. Park, Extraterritorial Impact of the United States Antitrust Laws and Com-
mercial Bribery Considerations, 1 DICK. J. INT'L L. 105, 108 (1982).
52. 549 F.2d 597.
53. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
54. Comment, Economic Rationality and Extraterritorial Application of United States Law
In Private Antitrust Litigation, 9 CARDOZO L.REv. 1401, 1406-07 (1988).
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tions. Both tests, although slightly different," require the court to con-
sider whether the interests of the U.S. in exercising jurisdiction are
sufficiently strong, "vis-a-vis those of other nations, to justify an assertion
of extraterritorial authority. 51 6  In other words, U.S. antitrust laws
should be applied to foreign conduct only when the U.S., on balance, is
the most interested nation state.57
Timberlane I and Mannington Mills reformulated the existing test
for U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction under the antitrust laws. The Third
and Ninth Circuits also offered a "mechanism that permitted emphasis
on strong antitrust enforcement to be reconciled with a sensitivity to the
legitimate concerns of foreign states regarding intrusions on their
sovereignty.
58
However, this "jurisdictional rule of reason" test is not the best de-
55. The difference between the two is that Timberlane I combined effects and interna-
tional comity as one question in determining whether to exercise jurisdiction. 549 F.2d at 613.
14. In contrast, Mannington Mills found the existence of jurisdiction first and then evaluated
international comity factors to determine whether the court should exercise jurisdiction. 595
F.2d at 1297-98.
56. Timberlane I, 549 F.2d at 613.
57. In balancing interests, the Timberlane I court considered the following factors:
mhe degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the
parties and the locations or principal places of business of corporations, the extent to
which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative
significance of effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere, the
extent to which there is [an] explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce,
the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance to the violations charged
of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct abroad.
549 F.2d at 614.
The Mannington Mills court indicated that the balancing process should entail considera-
tion of these factors:
1. Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
2. Nationality of the parties;
3. Relative importance of the alleged violation and conduct here compared to that
abroad;
4. Availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there;
5. Existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its foreseeability;
6. Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and grants
relief;
7. If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of being forced
to perform an act illegal in either country or be under conflicting requirements by
both countries;
8. Whether the court can make its order effective;
9. Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if made by the
foreign nation under similar circumstances;
10. Whether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed the issue.
595 F.2d at 1297-98.
58. Timberlane I, 549 F.2d at 615; John S. Shenefield, Thoughts on Extraterritorial Appli-
cation of the United States Antitrust Laws, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 350, 363 (1983).
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vice for resolving international conflicts involving extraterritorial appli-
cation of U.S. antitrust laws, because it has significant flaws. First, the
court is not the proper place to interpret various political factors and
balance national interests.59 Even if courts were competent to address
foreign affairs, the "jurisdictional rule of reason" would remain problem-
atic because it does not lead to predictable results. That is to say, Circuit
courts do not define or apply it uniformly.6 This unpredictability cre-
ates problems in business-planning.61 Lastly, the principle is unworkable
in cases where both the U.S. and the foreign nation have strong but jux-
taposed interests.62 Since the balancing approach in Timberlane I and
Mannington Mills was formulated, courts have placed greater emphasis
on the interests of the U.S. while giving less consideration to the legiti-
mate interests of the foreign nation.63
The Supreme Court has yet to expressly adopt the "balancing test"
developed by the Timberlane I and Mannington Mills courts." Even
though some Federal Courts have adopted this balancing approach,65
other Federal Courts have explicitly rejected it 66 and continued to adhere
to the "effects doctrine" articulated in the Alcoa decision.67 In conclu-
59. This criticism was upheld by the D.C. Circuit in Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Bel-
gian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting that it is improper for federal
courts, which are not "organs of political compromise" to defuse a conflict with foreign law by
"jettisoning our jurisdiction."). See also id. at 954 (concluding that "both institutional limita-
tions on the judicial process and Constitutional restrictions on the exercise of judicial power
make it unacceptable for the Judiciary to seize the political initiative and determine that legiti-
mate application of American laws must evaporate when challenged by a foreign
jurisdiction.").
60. For instance, even the Timberlane test is slightly different from that of Mannington
Mills. See supra notes 57-59.
61. Comment, supra note 54, at 1416-18.
62. Id. See also In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1979)
(noting that a balancing test is inherently unworkable where the competing interests at stake
are totally at odds with each other).
63. Donald J. Curotto, Comment, Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws and
Retaliatory Legislation by Foreign Countries, 11 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 577, 591 (1981).
See also Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 951 n.156. (stating that "courts inherently find it difficult
neutrally to balance competing foreign interests, [and w]hen there is any doubt, national inter-
ests will tend to be favored over foreign interests.").
64. Rather, a recent Supreme Court case seemed to reaffirm the "effects" doctrine. See
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 583 (1986).
65. See, eg., Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982);
Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 869-70 (10th Cir. 1981).
66. See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 949-54; In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248,
1255 (7th Cir. 1980) (stating that the court does not find the Timberlane I and Mannington
Mills decisions controlling).
67. Uranium, 617 F.2d at 1254 (holding that the district court had jurisdiction under the
"effects doctrine").
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sion, the "jurisdictional rule of reason" formulated by the Third and
Ninth Circuits has not contributed in a practical way to resolving the
existing extraterritorial conflict between the U.S. and the other Pacific
Countries.
B. Congressional Efforts
To reduce international conflicts, the U.S. Congress enacted the
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act of 1982 (FTAIA).68  This
Act amended the broad and general jurisdiction provisions of the Sher-
man Act 69 and the FTC Act,70 by providing that those provisions shall
not extend to conduct involving commerce with foreign nations, unless
that conduct has a direct, substantial, and "reasonably foreseeable effect"
on U.S. related commerce.
The "reasonably foreseeable effects" requirement placed FTAIA in
a neutral position between the "intended effects" test of Alcoa and the
"jurisdictional rule of reason."7 FTAIA leaves the court with the dis-
cretion to consider international comity in determining the jurisdictional
issue.72 Yet, in a practical sense, FTAIA does not resolve the interna-
tional conflict because the Act does not apply in the import trade or
commerce73 context where most conflicts arise.
74
Senate Bill 572,11 amending the FTAIA of 1982, attempted to re-
solve the conflict among the Circuit Courts covering the proper jurisdic-
tional test in international antitrust cases. More importantly, the bill
68. 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (Supp. 1992).
69. FTAIA § 402, 15 U.S.C. § 6a(l), provides:
[the Sherman Act] shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other
than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless-
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect-
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations,
or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, or a person en-
gaged in such trade or commerce in the United States. (emphasis added).
70. See FTAIA § 403, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3).
71. But see Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 946 n.137 (suggesting that, in passing FTAIA,
Congress did not intend to alter the current rules or the "effects" doctrine articulated in the
Alcoa decision, for application of the antitrust laws to conduct producing effects within the
U.S.). See also Harold R. Schmidt, The Extraterritorial Application (f the United States Anti.
trust Laws, 5 J.L. & COM. 321, 334-45 (asserting that the Alcoa test and "reasonably foresee-
able effects" test are virtually the same in effect).
72. H.R. REP. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982).
73. FTAIA § 403, 15 U.S.C. § 6(a)(1).
74. Eleanor M. Fox, Extraterritoriality, Antitrust, And The New Restatement: Is "Reason-
ableness" the Answer?, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 565, 580 (1987).
75. S. 572, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
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represented an attempt by the U.S. to lessen international tension arising
from the extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws. Section 103
of the bill codifies the "jurisdictional rule of reason" applied in the
Timberlane and Mannington Mills decisions.76 It requires a dismissal of
an antitrust action whenever the "rule of reason" would mandate dismis-
sal.77 An earlier version of the bill, Senate Bill 397, proposed to elimi-
nate the treble damage remedy in antitrust suits brought against foreign
defendants.78
Codification of the "jurisdictional rule of reason" coupled with de-
trebling provisions may improve foreign relations. However, it is ques-
tionable whether these unilateral efforts of the U.S. Congress will result
in other countries altering their blocking legislation. Even if Congress
adopted the "balancing" test bill, it is still likely that the U.S. courts will
refrain from exercising jurisdiction only where the U.S. interests are de
minimis.7 9 For this reason, foreign countries will not view adoption of a
"balancing" test as much of a concession. Thus, the unilateral efforts of
Congress are of limited effectiveness in addressing the extraterritorial
problems of U.S. antitrust law. The bill (S. 572,) has yet to reach the
Congressional floor."0
C. Justice Department Guidelines
The Antitrust Guidelines (Guidelines) of the Justice Department
(Department) state "[t]he reach of the U.S. antitrust laws is not limited
solely to conduct and transactions that occur within the United
States."8" The Guidelines adopt the "direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect" test provided in FTAIA for finding a violation of U.S.
76. Id § 103.
77. See Note, supra note 16, at 214. The balancing test adopted in this bill, however, is
slightly different from the Timberlane I and Manninglon Mills tests. The bill excludes some
obvious political factors contained in the latter. Compare S. 572 § 103 with the Timberlane I
and Mannington Mills factors illustrated supra note 57. For criticism of the bill's balancing
test, see, e.g., Note, supra note 16, at 214-16 (asserting that "[absent] guidance from the execu-
tive branch, the court therefore tend to favor U.S. interests"); Janusz A. Ordover, Conflicts of
Jurisdiction: Antitrust & Industrial Policy, 50 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165, 177 (Summer
1987).
78. S. 397, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1985). This provision was deleted in S.572 after the
Reagan Administration unsuccessfully proposed its own, more comprehensive, antitrust re-
form package, including proposals for limiting the treble damage remedy to certain antitrust
injuries. See S. 539, 100th., 1st Sess. § 4113 (1987). For a criticism of this provision, see Note,
supra note 16, at 217-19.
79. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
80. Joong Sik Shin, Comment, Extraterritorial Application of US. Antitrust Law, 25
LAND & WATER L. REv. 177 n.7 (1990).
81. Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, U.S. Department of
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antitrust laws and the existence of jurisdiction.82 Nonetheless, the De-
partment asserts jurisdiction only when such an assertion is reasonable
considering international comity."3 In performing a comity analysis, the
Department attempts to "balance" the interests of the U.S. and foreign
countries.8 4 This approach is virtually the same as that of Mannington
Mills.8" In practical effect, the Department has adopted the jurisdic-
tional rule of reason principle. However, unlike FI'AIA,86 the Guide-
lines cover import trade, and commerce with foreign nations.
87
Despite the merits of this approach, the Guidelines cannot wholly
resolve the international conflict discussed. "These Guidelines are in-
tended only to provide general guidance as to how the Department ana-
lyzes certain commonly occurring issues affecting its own enforcement
decisions."8 Thus, the Guidelines are unable to affect antitrust suits
brought by state enforcement agencies, or private antitrust suits in which
plaintiffs seek treble damages. 89
Justice Antitrust Division 29 (1988), reprinted in 55 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1391 (Nov. 17, 1988) (Special Supp.) [hereinafter Guidelines].
82. Id. at 19, 31.
83. Id. at 21-22. The Guidelines state, "[t]hus, in determining whether it would be rea-
sonable to assert jurisdiction... the Department considers whether significant interests of any
foreign sovereign would be affected and asserts jurisdiction only when the Department con-
eludes that it would be reasonable to do so." Id. In bringing enforcement actions, the Depart-
ment should "consult with interested foreign sovereigns through appropriate diplomatic
channels to attempt to eliminate or substantially reduce anticompetitive effects in the United
States." Id. at 22 n.167.
84. Id. at 22. In balancing the interests, the Department considers various factors
including:
(1) the relative significance, to the violation alleged, of conduce within the United
States as compared to conduct abroad;
(2) the nationality of the persons involved in or affected by the conduct;
(3) the presence or absence of a purpose to affect United States consumers or
competitors;
(4) the relative significance and foreseeability of the effects of the conduct on the
United States as compared to the effects abroad;
(5) the existence of reasonable expectations that would be furthered or defeated by
the action; and
(6) the degree of conflict with foreign law or articulated foreign economic policies.
Id. at 22 n.170.
85. 595 F.2d 1287, 1296-97 (3d Cir. 1979). For a comparison of these two approaches, see
supra notes 57, 84.
86. See FTAIA § 402, 15 U.S.C. § 6(a)(1).
87. Guidelines, supra note 81, at 21 (explicitly stating that "the Department also applies
the 'direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable [effects]' standard to import commerce.").
88. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
89. Id (stating that "[r]eaders [of the Guidelines] should separately evaluate the risk of
private litigation by competitors, consumers, and suppliers, as well as the risk of enforcement
by state prosecutors under state and federal antitrust laws.").
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The analysis in Part III leads to the conclusion that unilateral at-
tempts by the U.S. to resolve international conflicts caused by extraterri-
torial application of U.S. antitrust laws are fundamentally limited. This
is not only because each effort contains inherent flaws, but also because it
is ineffective in inducing other Pacific Countries to change their blocking
statutes. As an alternative to these unilateral attempts, Part IV proposes
that the U.S. enter into bilateral agreements with other Pacific Countries
to arrive at permanent solutions to such international conflicts. After
reviewing general issues relating to this proposal, Part IV examines what
specific provisions can or should be included in those agreements to re-
solve the extraterritorial antitrust conflicts within the Pacific
Community.
A. Proposals for International Treaties: A Preview
Many commentators suggest that diplomatic negotiations resulting
in either bilateral treaties or international conventions offer the best solu-
tion to international conflicts over extraterritorial application of U.S. an-
titrust laws.' However, very few commentators explore in detail what
types of provisions should be included in these treaties and whether such
provisions would be welcomed by the parties involved. Before exploring
these delicate issues, it is useful to resolve the following questions: (1) Do
bilateral or multilateral treaties, provide the best solution to extraterrito-
rial antitrust conflicts?, and (2) What provisions should such treaties in-
clude among their substantive, procedural, and remedial rules?
1. Bilateral Agreements or Multilateral Treaties
In the short term, bilateral agreements, as opposed to multilateral
treaties, are more likely to be reached. The existence of Canadian and
Australian agreements with the U.S.91 supports this view. However, one
90. See, eg., David J. Gerber, Fore~wrd: Antitrust and the Challenge of Internationaliza-
tion, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 689, 704 (1988); Joseph P. Griffin, Possible Resolutions ofInterna.
tional Disputes over Enforcement of US. Antitrust Laws, 18 STAN. J. L'rr'L L 279, 304-07
(1982); Glynn, supra note 12, at 48-49: Shin, supra note 80, at 205; Cannon, supra note 30, at
154; Comment, supra note 54, at 1418-20.
91. See supra note 24. To be sure, this does not mean that these existing bilateral agree-
ments are effective measures to solve the existing extraterritorial conflict. See supra notes 24-
26, 32-33 and accompanying text.
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commentator argues that "as the number of bilateral agreements in-
creases, so does the likelihood of inconsistency" and that "[t]his inconsis-
tency could eventually create as much confusion and dissension as do the
unilateral actions of the United States."' 92 The commentator concludes
that the best long-term solution lies with multilateral agreements rather
than bilateral agreements. 93 However, in the context of the Pacific Com-
munity, this argument is not entirely correct. Some Pacific Countries
such as Canada and Australia have strong blocking statutes, where
others have weaker indirect blocking statutes94 or none at all. The de-
gree of extraterritorial conflict between the U.S. and each Pacific Coun-
try can vary, not only according to the frequency of antitrust disputes,
but also according to the contents of blocking statutes. Thus, inconsis-
tency among bilateral agreements is inevitable and unavoidable. Further,
from a practical point of view it is unlikely that multilateral agreements
with regard to international antitrust litigation can be made within the
Pacific Community. Even though the common concerns of most Pacific
Countries regarding extraterritorial conflict can be verified, it is doubtful
that multilateral agreements addressing only those concerns can signifi-
cantly contribute to the resolution of such conflicts.
For these reasons, this Article recommends that the U.S. and the
other Pacific Countries should initially attempt to enter into bilateral
agreements in order to resolve the current conflict. Once these bilateral
agreements have been shown to work, they can then be converted to mul-
tilateral agreements, unless such conversion is precluded by the conflict-
ing national interests of parties.
2. Substantive, Jurisdictional, and Remedial Rules
It can be envisioned that the international treaties suggested would
include specific substantive rules. However, such agreements will be dif-
ficult to reach because each country has a distinct antitrust policy and
different substantive standards relating to their domestic antitrust laws.95
One commentator argues that "the basic functional objectives of
competition law ... are everywhere much the same" 96 and that "some
problems such as the potential harm from international cartelization are
widely recognized, and agreement on substantive principles to combat
92. Griffin, supra note 90, at 305.
93. Id.
94. Japan and Korea fall into this category. See supra Part II, § 4.
95. See Shin, supra note 80, at 205.
96. Gerber, supra note 90, at 705.
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such cartelization may be attainable among discrete groups of states." 97
Within the Pacific Community this argument has less merit. Many Pa-
cific Countries do not have any domestic antitrust statute. Even the Pa-
cific Countries which have antitrust laws that reflect similar objectives
are likely to hold different perspectives regarding enforcement of anti-
trust laws in the international context.98 The conflicting national inter-
ests surrounding international competition functions to deter countries
from adopting similar substantive rules regulating anticompetitive behav-
iors in international trade. This is true although most countries have
similar objectives of competition law.
More importantly, agreements on substantive antitrust principles
would not contribute to resolution of international conflicts caused by
the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws. Such conflicts arise
basically from jurisdictional matters, even in the absence of substantive
disagreements between the U.S. and its counterparts. The United King-
dom, for instance, has a set of laws prohibiting anticompetitive behavior
such as cartels and restrictive practices.9 9 These laws are very similar to
U.S. antitrust laws."oo The substantive similarity in policies, however,
has not prevented the emergence of jurisdictional disputes between the
U.S. and Great Britain.10 1
In sum, agreements on the substantive rules of antitrust laws are
difficult to reach for many reasons. Furthermore, these agreements
would be ineffective in resolving the extraterritorial conflicts caused
mainly by the jurisdictional disputes. Thus, this Article recommends
97. Id at 704.
98. A number of Pacific countries, including the U.S., exempt exporters from their anti-
trust laws in certain areas. For example, the Webb-Pomerene Act of the U.S. provides a lim-
ited antitrust exemption to the export of "goods, wares, or merchandise". See 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-
65 (1982). The U.S. Export Trading Company Act of 1982 also sets forth limited immunity
from antitrust suits. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 4011-4021 (1988). The Korean Antitrust Act also in-
cludes a provision which exempts potentially anti-competitive behaviors from the Act, consid-
ering international competition. See Article 7 of the Korean Antitrust Act, No. 3320 (1980).
99. The principal British laws are: the Competition Act of 1980; the Restrictive Trade
Practices Act of 1976; and the Fair Trading Act of 1973, reproduced in CoMPErITION LAW IN
WESTERN EUROPE AND THE USA, pt. 3, § UK/L (United Kingdom/Legislation) (D. Gijistra
ed. 1976). For a general discussion of the British laws, see VALENTINE KORAH, COMPE'I-
TION LAW OF BRITAIN AND THE COMMON MARKET (3d ed. 1982).
100. Diane P. Wood, Conflicts of Jurisdiction in Antitrust Law: A Comment on Ordover and
Atwood, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROnS. 179, 181 (Summer 1987).
101. See, eg., In re Ocean Shipping Antitrust Litig., 1982-1 Trade Cas.(CCH) r 64,585
(S.D.N.Y.1982); Rio Tintio Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] 1 All E.R. 434
(H.L. 1977); Laker Airways, Ltd .Pan Am. World Airwys. In., 604 F. Supp. 280 (D. D.C.
1984); Laker Airways Ltd v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F. 2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
For the British blocking statutes, including "clawback" provision, see supra note 20.
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that the proposed agreements should directly address the issues of juris-
diction, treble damages, and blocking statutes, out of which most extra-
territorial antitrust conflicts arise.
B. Contents of the Proposed International Treaties
The primary goal of international treaties proposed in this Article is
the resolution of international conflicts between the extraterritorial appli-
cation of U.S. antitrust laws and the existing or potential retaliatory re-
sponses of other countries. In order to attain this goal, the proposed
treaties must directly deal with the precise causes of such conflicts. As
noted earlier, the extraterritorial conflict stems from the actions of both
the U.S. and various foreign countries. Generally, foreign countries com-
plain that the U.S. federal courts have often exercised excessive "long-
arm" jurisdiction over the foreign defendants. Hence, most of the inter-
national conflicts referred to emerge from a jurisdictional dispute. In ad-
dition, one of the most objectionable aspects of U.S. antitrust laws, from
the perspective of foreign governments, is the existence of the private
treble damage remedy. 10 2 Thus, any effective agreement must address
these two issues: jurisdiction and treble damages.
Foreign countries' complaints have resulted in the legislation of, or
threats to, invoke already existing blocking statutes. In the U.S., plain-
tiffs attempting to obtain evidence or enforce U.S. court judgments in
another Pacific Country are often faced with that country's invocation of
a blocking provision. Therefore, any proposed agreement should also
contribute to changes in these blocking statutes.
As a result, any proposed agreement should include provisions af-
fecting both U.S. antitrust law and the foreign country's existing or po-
tential blocking legislation. In other words, the agreements should be
premised on "reciprocity." The reciprocal nature of such proposals
would enhance the possibility of enacting such agreements. This Article
now addresses how specific provisions of the proposed agreements should
deal with the issues illustrated above and whether these provisions are
plausible.
102. See Peter Durack, Attorney-General of Australia, Press Release No. 73/80 (Oct. 5,
1980) (stating, "[It] is coming to be recognized that perhaps the major difficulty experienced by
foreign governments through the extraterritorial enforcement of United States antitrust laws
results from private treble damage actions."). See also Shenefield, supra note 58, at 356,
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1. Provisions Affecting the U.S. Antitrust Rules
a. Allocation of Jurisdiction
To avoid jurisdictional disputes in antitrust cases involving foreign
defendants, a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and each of the other
Pacific Countries mentioned should provide for allocation of jurisdiction.
There are two possible approaches to allocation of jurisdiction.
The first type of allocational rule is hierarchical. This rule attempts
to create a standard hierarchy among the various bases of jurisdiction.
One commentator illustrates a possible hierarchy as follows: "The coun-
try where the activities took place, with the 'pure territorial jurisdiction,'
may have the highest claim; the country that wishes to prescribe rules for
its nationals might be next; and the country wishing to protect itself
against adverse effects from abroad might be last."103 However, this ap-
proach could be unattractive to both the U.S. and other Pacific Coun-
tries. Most jurisdictional disputes in the U.S. courts arise as a result of
applying the "effects doctrine" to antitrust activities committed abroad.
The hierarchical approach, in such disputes, would place the U.S. last in
the hierarchy. Clearly, the U.S. would argue against this position. Fur-
ther, there are also cases where the U.S. counterparts would object to a
hierarchical approach. For instance, assume that foreign producers are
in collusion outside the U.S. with the purpose of predatory pricing and
to export their products to the U.S. If the prohibited "activities" are
construed broadly enough to include acts of purveying products at preda-
tory prices, as well as the collusion itself, the "activities" could be
deemed to also occur in the U.S. U.S. plaintiffs, in such a case, could
argue that the U.S. has the highest claim of jurisdiction. It seems likely
that U.S. courts would favorably view such an argument. Given this
possibility, other Pacific Countries might view adopting this hierarchical
rule as disadvantageous. Thus, each of the parties may be unwilling to
accept such an arrangement.
The alternative allocational rule is termed the "jurisdictional rule of
reason." A bilateral agreement could stipulate the precise factors that
courts should consider in determining whether to exercise jurisdiction.
These factors, of course, may contain little more than those sug-
gested in Timberlane I, FTAIA of 1982, or the Antitrust Guidelines of
Justice Department." However, jurisdictional rules stipulated in pro-
posed bilateral agreements have advantages to the extent they contribute
103. Wood, supra note 100, at 182.
104. See supra notes 57, 69.
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to resolutions of extraterritoriality conflicts over the unilateral efforts of
the U.S.
A comparison of the proposed allocational rule with the Timberlane
I test illustrates this point. As discussed, the Timberlane I approach is
weak in three areas. First, the court is not in a proper position to balance
conflicting national interests and consider foreign relations.105 In con-
trast, the proposed jurisdictional rule is free from this criticism, since the
rule is created not by the court, but by the political representatives of
each sovereign. The latter has superior expertise and authority to negoti-
ate with foreign sovereigns on jurisdictional matters. Further, a court
would encounter little difficulty in applying a standard which reflects
political factors that are expressed in the bilateral treaties. An additional
flaw of the Timberlane I approach is that courts do not apply the balanc-
ing test in a uniform manner. This results in unpredictability. 06 The
proposed rule resolves this dilemma. Under a jurisdictional rule adopted
in a bilateral treaty, the balancing test will be standardized. A final
weakness of the Timberlane I approach is that it does not provide a solu-
tion in cases where both the U.S. and a foreign nation have strong but
conflicting interests.107 This problem could be resolved by use of a sup-
plementary provision creating a diplomatic mechanism which provides
for advance consultation of the parties.10
The FTAIA of 1982 is also inferior to the proposed jurisdiction rule
as a device for resolving the international antitrust conflict. As noted
earlier, section 402 of the FTAIA does not apply to import trade or com-
105. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
108. The OECD Recommendation adopted by the council of the OECD on May 21, 1986
contains just such a consultation provision with respect to the issue of allocation of jurisdic-
tion. See The 1986 Recommendation of the OECD Council Concerning Cooperation between
Members and Countries on Restrictive Business Practices Affecting International Trade,
OECD Coc. C(86) 44 (1986), reprinted in BARRY E. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MAR-
KET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST, A COMPARATIVE GUIDE app. 35, at 459-62 (2d ed.
Supp. 1990).
The Recommendation provides that when a member country concludes that the enter-
prises in a second member country are having an adverse effect on its interests, the first coun-
try may request the competition agency of the second country to engage in consultations
designed to encourage the second country to take steps to ensure that its enterprises cease the
harmful behavior. To date, there are no public records of any member country taking advan.
tage of this provision. See Glynn, supra note 12, at 39. The ineffectiveness of this provision,
however, results not from the nature of the provision, but from the lack of legal binding force
of the Recommendation. In other words, such a provision would be effective if it is included in
a bilateral treaties which is legally binding on both parties.
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merce, out of which most conflicts arise.119 This is viewed as the most
significant limitation of the Act. Bilateral agreements, however, can
compel the U.S. and its trading partners to apply the "jurisdictional rule
of reason" even to antitrust cases involving foreign commerce. The "re-
ciprocal" nature of bilateral agreements will ensure that neither country
will exercise "long-arm jurisdiction" which is too extensive over foreign
activities. This includes imports from parties to such agreement.
Lastly, the proposed jurisdictional rule is free from the practical lim-
itations that plague the Antitrust Guidelines of the Justice Department.
The Guidelines adopting the jurisdictional rule of reason are unable to
affect private treble damage suits. 110 The agreements proposed can and
should address private antitrust suits.
In conclusion, contrary to the unilateral efforts of the U.S., an allo-
cational rule of jurisdiction stipulated in proposed bilateral agreements
will contribute significantly to the resolution of international conflicts
caused by the issue of jurisdiction in antitrust cases.
b. Detrebling Provisions
Because it is viewed as punitive, the treble damage remedy is one of
the principal catalysts of international antitrust disputes.' Thus, in
terms of foreign relations, treble damages in antitrust cases involving for-
eign defendants should be eliminated or minimized. From a U.S. per-
spective, since these provisions can undermine U.S. domestic antitrust
policies, it is necessary to analyze the costs and benefits of detrebling
provisions."' This analysis depends upon how and to what extent bilat-
eral agreements alter treble damage recovery. There are several ap-
proaches to this question.
First, an agreement could require that "foreign commerce treble
damage cases be prosecuted exclusively by the U.S. government on be-
half of the injured plaintiffs." 1 3 A nationalparenspatriae role is concep-
tually attractive in the sense that it only brings meritorious claims to
109. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
111. See A.H. Hermann, Extraterritorial Application of National Laws Regulating Business
Activities, 7 DITCHLEY J. 14, 20-21 (1980); Durack, supra note 102; W.M. Knighton, C.B.,
Nationality and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: U.S. Law Abroad, Remarks Before the Interna-
tional Law Institute of the Georgetown University Law Center 2 (Aug. 13, 1981); Shenefield,
supra note 58, at 356.
112. Gerber, supra note 90, at 704 (stating that "effective response to the impact of interna-
tionalizing competition requires analysis of the opportunities for cooperation as well as the
feasibility, benefits and costs of such cooperation.").
113. Cira, supra note 8, at 273.
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court. However, this proposal is an inadequate incentive for foreign
countries to modify their blocking statutes. The typical blocking provi-
sions, so-called "clawback" provisions, are intended to enable the defend-
ant to recover damage payments above the amount of compensatory
damages. Regardless of how cautious the U.S. is in bringing treble dam-
age suits, it would not alleviate international conflicts caused by a foreign
government's distaste for treble damage recovery system itself.
Second, domestic provisions for automatic trebling of damage
awards could be amended by a bilateral agreement to provide for the
imposition of treble damages at the discretion of the court after consider-
ation of various factors set forth in the agreement. 1 4 Such factors might
include: "[1.] the foreign parties' knowledge of U.S. law, [2.] the intent of
the foreign party to violate U.S. law, [3.] the degree of foreign govern-
mental involvement, and [4.] whether the U.S. government [has] engaged
in anticompetitive conduct that had precipitated foreign anticompetitive
responses."
515
This second approach is also seriously flawed because it would be
difficult for a court to apply such subjective factors as "knowledge" or
"intent" of foreign parties. This could result in unpredictability. In ad-
dition, factors 3 and 4 lack relevance to the illegality of the challenged
activities. Rather, these factors are relevant to political considerations.
It is undesirable to have political considerations, rather than the nature
of anticompetitive activities, determine the antitrust remedy in a specific
case. Finally, and most importantly, this proposal would not be a suffi-
cient incentive for foreign countries to change their blocking legislation,
and thus also fails to resolve extraterritorial conflict surrounding anti-
trust law.
This Article proposes to include in bilateral agreements provisions
which eliminate treble damages in antitrust cases involving foreign com-
merce. The adoption of detrebling provisions would represent only one
way to effectively induce foreign countries to repeal or at least to cease
invoking their blocking statutes.
It is generally accepted that treble damages provide an incentive for
a plaintiff to detect antitrust violations." 6 Focusing on this incentive is-
sue, one commentator argues that, the detrebling scheme would "dis-
courage private U.S. plaintiffs with meritorious claims from suing foreign
defendants."' This argument is misplaced in the context of extraterri-
114. Griffin, supra note 90, at 302
115. Id (emphasis added).
116. See generally AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 4, at 83-84.
117. Note, supra note 16, at 219-20.
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torial application of U.S. antitrust laws. As noted earlier, the most objec-
tionable aspect of U.S. antitrust laws, from the perspective of foreign
governments, is the private treble damage remedy.118 Foreign govern-
ments are more likely to invoke their blocking statutes when private U.S.
plaintiffs involved in treble damages actions attempt to obtain evidence
or enforce U.S. judgments abroad. Realizing that foreign legislative bar-
riers against treble damages recovery exist anyway, private U.S. plaintiffs
will likely still be deterred from suing foreign defendants. Thus, the
existence of treble damages recovery in antitrust cases involving foreign
defendants actually results in chilling, rather than promoting, private an-
titrust actions. 19 In this sense, a detrebling scheme is consistent with
incentive considerations.
A detrebling scheme as applied to foreign commerce might be criti-
cized for resulting in uneven enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws. How-
ever, treble damages recovery is not an absolute remedy under U.S.
antitrust laws. For example, the National Cooperative Research Act of
1984,120 which passed both houses of Congress unanimously, created ex-
ceptions to treble damage recovery in private antitrust cases. If joint re-
search and development ventures are held unlawful, only actual
damages, rather than treble damages, are to be awarded for any resulting
injuries provided that certain conditions are met. This new Act indicates
Congressional willingness to reduce treble damages to only actual dam-
ages if the justifications are reasonable for creating such an exception.
Antitrust cases involving foreign commerce fall within this exception.
Any proposal involving a detrebling scheme will possess some prac-
tical problems. Difficulty lies in attempting to segregate "foreign com-
merce" cases for special treatment, since there is no line between the
domestic and foreign commerce. In practice, the degree of "foreignness"
of a given case varies widely. 2' Nonetheless, despite this drawback, this
proposal still has merit. The primary goal of a detrebling scheme is not
to draw the perfect line for making such a distinction, but rather to con-
tribute to resolving extraterritorial conflicts. Hence, although detrebling
provisions cannot perfectly draw an objective line between domestic and
foreign commerce, this is not a material drawback if the parties to a bilat-
eral treaty agree to "specific lines."
118. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
119. Some might also argue that "the benefits of the deterrent effects of treble damages are
not worth their cost in terms of their detrimental impact on foreign relations." See Grilfin,
supra note 90, at 302.
120. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 4301-4304 (1987).
121. For a discussion of this problem, see Cira, supra note 8, at 273.
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In conclusion, the treble damage recovery should be eliminated in
U.S. antitrust cases involving foreign commerce through detrebling pro-
visions within bilateral treaties.
2. Provisions Affecting the Blocking Statutes of Other Pacific
Countries
Subsection A recommended that an allocation of jurisdiction and
detrebling scheme should be included in any proposed agreement in an
effort to induce other Pacific Countries to amend their blocking legisla-
tion. In response to such provisions directly affecting U.S. antitrust laws,
the proposed agreements should also aim to affect other Pacific Coun-
tries' blocking statutes. This subsection examines this aspect of such
agreements.
a. Elimination of Discovery Blocking Provisions
As discussed earlier, discovery blocking statutes of other Pacific
Countries contribute to the extraterritorial antitrust conflict with the
U.S. discovery blocking legislation, and, therefore, should be altered to
resolve these conflicts.
Some countries may believe that to repeal their discovery blocking
statutes in exchange for U.S. modifications of its antitrust laws, such as
allocation of jurisdiction rules and eliminating treble damage recovery, is
not an equitable solution. This perception is erroneous. Repealing dis-
covery blocking statutes through bilateral agreements will not result in a
significant loss for Pacific Countries. For one, the U.S. government has
more often than not filed antitrust suits regardless of the foreign govern-
ment's invocation of blocking legislation. The coconut oil case in the
Philippines is a typical example.122 Further, in the Uranium case, the
U.S. district court held a Canadian corporation in con-tempt for failing to
produce documents located in its Canadian office.' 2a The order imposed
a significant fine on the Canadian company and authorized, if the fine
was not paid, a U.S. marshal to seize its corporate property located
within the U.S. to satisfy the fine. 24 Such examples imply that discovery
blocking statutes of Pacific Countries are not as effective in protecting
national interests when the U.S. government or court is determined to
overcome the operation of such statutes.
122. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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Thus, Pacific Countries are encouraged to reach agreement with the
U.S. by repealing their discovery blocking statutes in exchange for provi-
sions modifying U.S. antitrust laws. Clearly, in cases where the statutes
serve other legitimate purposes, any agreement should be constructed so
as not to affect these legitimate alternative goals.
b. Enforcement of U.S. Court Judgments
Judgment blocking statutes of the Pacific Countries have also pro-
moted international conflict resulting from extraterritorial application of
U.S. antitrust laws. As a resolution, foreign countries should attempt to
reach agreement with the U.S. by repealing the blocking provisions at
least in the context of enforcement of U.S. court judgments in antitrust
cases.
As in the case of discovery blocking statutes, foreign countries
might also believe that, to the extent they can refuse to enforce U.S. court
judgments, they have nothing to lose by rejecting a bilateral agreement
with the U.S. This would ignore the fact that enforcement of U.S. judg-
ments can be accomplished solely within the U.S. For example, if a for-
eign defendant company owns corporate assets of sufficient value in the
U.S., then U.S. plaintiffs can enforce treble damage judgments in the U.S.
This is true, despite the existence of a judgment blocking statute in the
Pacific Country. Moreover, even if foreign defendants have no assets in
the U.S., invoking a judgment blocking statute without justifiable reasons
could damage relations between the U.S. and the Pacific Country.
For these reasons, Pacific Countries with judgment blocking statutes
would benefit by entering into bilateral agreements with the U.S. to re-
peal the blocking statutes in exchange for the U.S. adopting jurisdictional
rules and detrebling provisions. To be sure, in the cases where the stat-
utes were not legislated directly for purposes of blocking U.S. judgments
in antitrust cases, as in Japan and Korea, an alternative solution may
exist. A bilateral agreement could provide that a blocking statute shall
not be invoked for the purpose of blocking U.S. judgments in antitrust
cases provided the U.S. courts comply with other provisions of the
agreement.
V. CONCLUSION
For the last decade, extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust
laws has resulted in continued international conflict between the U.S.
and its trading partners, including the Pacific Countries. These conflicts
stem mainly from the complaints of the other Pacific Countries about the
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long-arm jurisdiction of the U.S. courts based upon the "effects doctrine"
and the treble damage remedy available in private U.S. antitrust cases.
Several Pacific Countries have responded by legislating retaliatory block-
ing statutes. The domestic efforts of the U.S. to resolve these interna-
tional conflicts are significantly limited due to their unilateral nature.
Diplomatic negotiations resulting in bilateral treaties offer the best solu-
tion. In order to enhance their feasibility, such bilateral agreements
should be based upon reciprocity and balancing of the parties' national
interests. For this reason, any agreement should include provisions af-
fecting both the U.S. antitrust laws and the blocking statutes of other
Pacific Countries.
This Article recommends that the U.S. accept proposals for the allo-
cation of jurisdiction rules and the elimination of treble damage recovery
in antitrust cases involving foreign commerce. In exchange, other Pacific
Countries are encouraged to repeal or to cease invoking their blocking
statutes.
